Hospitality, or Kant's Critique of Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights
On one prominent view of global justice, all humankind is tied by moral bonds to care for a cosmopolitan society spanning the entire globe. Duties of justice to individuals do not end at borders but include positive obligations to secure a potentially expansive list of human rights of persons everywhere, perhaps including care for their material welfare, and this may require international action or intervention when one cannot rely on local governments. On a second, less sanguine view, most of this is nothing but a recipe for permanent war. Because the sole legitimate aim of international politics is avoiding war whenever possible, the only valid casus belli is the violation or threatened violation of one state's sovereignty by another. Enforcement of human rights is an internal matter for states, and any peremptory rights of stateless persons or individuals across borders must be limited as narrowly as possible to ensure they could never invite new conflicts by competing with state sovereignty. Above all, any positive claims of justice grounded in membership in a world community, beyond the most minimal injunction against waging war at will on foreigners, must be relegated to the dustbin of history as among the greatest obstacles to lasting peace. In the world we inhabit, such claims can only provide pretexts for powers keen to rationalize self-interested belligerence by dressing it up in the sanctimonious language of philanthropy. Now Kant's theory of what we may loosely call international politics is often presented as a more or less distinctive version of the first view. But in fact his view was the second, and the first that of thinkers he opposed. Too often Kant is read on the presumption that the major choice in politics is whether to stand on the side of principle, reason, and morality or instead with realist critics such as Hobbes or Schmitt. But this obscures the originality of Kant's views: in fact he made a point of defending a third alternative, one unshaken by Hobbes' radical critique just because it took that critique explicitly as its own point of departure, but which nevertheless went on to defend a role for principles of justice also beyond state borders as a further part of a solution to the problem of a war of all against all. The stakes in this concern more than Kant interpretation, moreover, because if I am right, then Kant advanced a powerful alternative to an all-too familiar forced choice between moralism and immoralism in international politics.
This article considers one major piece of Kant's solution-his novel category of "cosmopolitan right" [Weltbürgerrecht] , which he limited to the single right of "hospitality" [Hospitalität, Wirthbarkeit] . There is no agreement in the literature on what this right of hospitality entails or how Kant's brief discussions purport to justify it. The key, I will show, is to see that when Kant formulated hospitality as a right "that it not be justified to be met as an enemy" or "not to be treated as an enemy" simply for arriving on foreign shores with offers of trade, he was joining a centuries-long argument in the law of nations over who counts as an "enemy" who may be justly repelled or conquered in war.
1 Contrary to what is almost universally supposed, the point of this for Kant was not to secure a positive right to anything, but simply to rule out familiar justifications for declaring others "enemies" and thereby overriding their provisional rights-holding already in the state of nature-to defend themselves and their possessions from attack. A contrary interpretation of the "sacred right of hospitality" had been invoked, famously, by thinkers including Vitoria and Grotius precisely to justify colonial wars in pursuit of commerce, and Kant's reworking drew on Vattel's criticisms of those predecessors on just this point, while regrounding the right, in sharp contrast to Vattel, as a solution to Hobbes'
problem of how to escape the state of nature. Perhaps one reason this has been so difficult for commentators to pin down is that few are similarly comfortable with both Kant's critical philosophical logic and the centuries-long tradition of the law of nations with which he engaged. 6 The first section of this article thus situates Kant's intervention against the background of divergent eighteenth-century approaches to the law of nations or ius gentium. The next deepens this background with a very condensed overview of a few of the most relevant controversies in the longer ius gentium tradition reaching back to ancient Rome and through its radical reformulation in the early modern period. The third section explains in detail Kant's right of hospitality and the argument he offered in its favor. In this article I do not try to defend Kant's views or to consider how they might need to be adjusted for today's world. What I mean to show is that his position is different than has widely been supposed. It is a powerful view that has not received the attention it deserves and which still demands a response today.
Kant and the Ius Gentium Tradition
There is no doubt that Kant saw his writings on international politics as interventions in Hannover, 1693), as he appears to have lifted from it the joke that opens Perpetual Peace. And although it is possible that his knowledge of the Roman civil law tradition was second-hand, in a lecture of the early 1770s he described the Corpus iuris civilis, the sixth-century CE compilation of Roman law from which the later ius gentium tradition derives, as "certainly the greatest and surest evidence of the profundity of human thought" and referred to the apocryphal 1137 rediscovery of the Digest at Amalfi as "the best find among books that humankind ever could have made" (24.181). Kant's intervention was to bring together in a novel and systematic way certain lines of thought in two competing eighteenth-century approaches to the questions of ius gentium and just war theory. One line had begun with Hobbes' radical insistence that the state of nature was a state of war of all against all, and that the first command of justice was therefore to leave it-"exeundum esse ex statu naturali," in the mantra Kant explicitly attributed to Hobbes and never tired of repeating. 10 Rousseau followed Hobbes in rejecting natural sociability as a ground for law independent of a sovereign will, but he proposed a way out of Hobbes' state of nature among nations by adapting the Abbé St-Pierre's plan for a permanent pan-European society to provide for mutual security. 11 Kant followed Rousseau (with some adjustments) in responding to the problem of war by seeking to establish certain relations among sovereign political institutions, rather than by appealing directly to the authority of any freestanding law of nature and nations.
The latter was the approach of the mainstream modern ius gentium tradition, from But Pufendorf also made another key move, breaking with the line of argument from Vitoria to Grotius that violations of this law of nations constitute "injuries" justifying coercive retribution-paradigmatically in the case of native Americans, whose purported refusal to honor a ius gentium obligation to allow free access to European traders was held to justify colonial conquest. Pufendorf drew a clear distinction under the law of nations between "perfect" duties, pertaining to "justice", and "imperfect" duties of mere "humanity or love", and insisted that only violations of the former justify the use of force whereas the latter oblige solely in foro interno (3.4.1). 13 Duties to commerce are imperfect (unless one makes them perfect by consenting to a contract or treaty), and therefore foreigners may never claim a right of commerce or hospitality against us "without our permission and against our will" (3. henceforth "Völkerrecht" properly understood ought to mean nothing but "ius publicum civitatum" (the public law of states, 6:343).
This, however, would seem to leave no basis for principles governing relations with nonstate peoples. And so Kant made a third move, introducing the novel category of "cosmopolitan right". The commonplace that this represented a revolutionary extension of right to individuals independent of state membership could hardly be further from the truth. 16 Ius gentium applied to individuals already in ancient Rome, and although the suggestion that it specifically concerned interstate relations had gained ground since Francisco Suárez first proposed it in 1612, the ius gentium right of commerce or hospitality that Kant retained had become a central element of the law nations with Vitoria and remained so down to Wolff and Vattel. 17 So in coining the new term "Weltbürgerrecht", Kant did not extend the scope of the law of nations at all, he only salvaged a single very familiar piece of it which otherwise would have been entirely lost with the way he had redefined the traditionally more inclusive term "Völkerrecht". Indeed, Kant insisted most explicitly on "limiting" (not extending) cosmopolitan right to that single right of hospitality, by which he can only have meant to rule out appeals to any further ius gentium rights-such as familiar ones to aid in necessity or protection from one's own prince, to pass armies through others' territory, or particularly to demand freedom of trade-any of which would threaten to reignite the sort of ius controversum his entire strategy was designed to escape. This is what I mean in saying that Kant offered a "critique"-in his distinctive sense-of cosmopolitanism and human rights, even though he identified his project with both terms. In each case, he insisted on defining the term in a sense narrower than that it replaced, to avoid overstepping the bounds of what in it could actually be proven obligatory. By reflecting on the conditions of possibility of binding external law per se, Kant thought one could arrive at a demand for perpetual peace, and from that for the need first for states, then a pacific federation, and finally the right of hospitality. Everything in the law of nature and nations that could not be justified this way, as a response to the Hobbesian problem of right in controversy, had to be thrown out. But what was left was secured from skepticism toward other sorts of justifications that had to rely on conformity to custom, the benevolence of human nature, or the fear of God.
What was radical in Kant's view was that rather than papering over the problem of disagreement over justice he redefined the content of justice itself by reflecting on the logical conditions of any non-question-begging solution to the disagreement. To suggest instead that what distinguished his position was that it gave individuals more rights is both to miss the point of critique, here, for Kant and to get the history the wrong way around.
A Very Brief Overview of the Ius Gentium Tradition
Ius gentium was originally a category of Roman law contrasted to the civil law peculiar to Rome because taken to apply to all peoples. One usage, reported in Sallust, Livy, Seneca, and Tacitus, inter alia, covered sacred obligations enjoining rules for initiating war, as well as protecting legates and honoring treaties. 18 But another sense, more prominent among jurists, referred to a body of private law developed by the praetor peregrinus from 242 BCE, once the Roman republic had incorporated its Italian neighbors. Whereas ius civile was restricted to Roman citizens, ius gentium was available also to regulate commerce and resolve disputes involving non-citizens, or peregrini. 19 The extension of citizenship to all free male Roman subjects in 212 CE deprived the category of its rationale, but the term survived and the relationship among natural law, the law of nations, and civil law remained controversial for centuries. The oldest surviving references to "ius gentium" are in Cicero (though see Gellius The law of nations is common to the entire human race, for nations established certain laws for themselves as occasion and human necessities required. For wars arose, and captivities and slavery followed, which are contrary to the law of nature (since by the law of nature all men are originally born free). Also, from this law nearly all contracts were introduced, such as of purchase and sale, leasing and hiring, partnership, deposits, loans redeemable in kind, and innumerable others (1.2).
There was more agreement on the content of ius gentium than on its definition: it was generally accepted that it governed war, property, contracts, and particularly slavery. 20 Two things ought to strike a modern reader. First is that in Rome much of the law of nations was private law applying directly to individuals. Although it covered laws of war and embassies, among its central institutions were also property, commerce, and slavery. No Roman jurist distinguished ius gentium from other law because it applied to states rather than to individuals; the point was rather that unlike ius civile it applied not only to Roman citizens but to everyone, and disagreements over its relation to natural law turned on explaining how that might be so. The second point is that ius gentium was one of several sorts of law internal to the Roman legal system, developed and applied by Roman institutions. The various stories told about its sources were attempts to rationalize this system from inside, to minimize ambiguities and contradictions in inherited law with the practical aim of resolving disputes among persons subject to Roman power-they were not attempts to shore up the authority of Roman power in the first place. One presumed a right to rule over a pre-existing political community in accordance with law and asked how that law should be interpreted. One worried about resolving conflicts of jurisdiction internal to that complex community, but not with justifying the authority of the law in general or the power to enforce it up to or beyond any sort of external territorial bound. This point is essential, because the survival of the Corpus iuris and its revival from the end of the eleventh century meant that down through the late medieval period these assumptions would outlive the actual Roman political institutions within which they had originally made sense. It was only in the early modern period, particularly after the discovery of the Americas, that they fell into crisis and the entire framework linking natural law, the law of nations, and civil law would be rethought on radically new foundations.
In the medieval period, the Roman law of the Corpus iuris was variously overlaid with both Christian doctrine and Aristotelian philosophy, the latter taken to document precepts of This shared framework fell into crisis in the early modern period as the discovery of the Americas, the rise of a skeptical humanism first in the Italian city-states, and then the Reformation conspired to undercut the authority of universal Church and Empire. The tradition had understood itself as the living law of a real and universal community under a continuous authority that had been transferred from the ancient Byzantine Empire to the Holy Roman via the Pope. 22 As this assumption collapsed in the early modern period, the Roman law, including the law of nations, was left hanging in the air. the Thomist tradition to make up the difference. 23 Notably, it was only at this time that ius gentium was first systematically distinguished, by Suárez in 1612, from ius naturale and civile as that species of law applying specifically to states or nations in their external relations, rather than to the individuals inside them.
In a second phase, a strand of thought I call "humanist radicals" 24 -preeminently Gentili, A third phase of response to the crisis began when the post-scholastic radicals divided into three broad camps over the course of the seventeenth century. In the last section we encountered the first, rationalist (and decidedly Protestant) line that ran from Pufendorf to Vattel.
Grotius and Hobbes had attempted to reconstruct the law of nature or nations on a rational basis broadly more geometrico. But each also kept one foot in a humanist culture they shared with Gentili, freely mixing logical argument with rhetorical appeals. 25 Pufendorf retrospectively claimed Grotius's mantle by emphasizing his ambition to logical system and purporting to carry it further, and by the eighteenth century Barbeyrac, Burlamaqui, Wolff, Vattel and their followers had made good on Pufendorf's ambition to establish a philosophically grounded school in "the law of nature and nations" to supplant the scholastic tradition, claiming Grotius as its founder. 26 This approach claimed to underwrite the authority of ius gentium by closely tying it to natural law, and that of natural law by purporting to derive it systematically from a small number of principles of human nature (typically natural drives to self-preservation, society and the perfection of the rational faculties). Treaties and custom provided additional sources of the law of nations within the constraints of natural law. But authors disagreed sharply over a fourth category of the "voluntary law of nations" coined by Grotius to describe positive law sanctioned by the will of "all or most" nations. 27 Pufendorf and Barbeyrac called this a chimera, whereas
Wolff reinterpreted it as derived from the will of a global "civitas maxima" to which all nations were bound by nature to submit, concluding that since it was impossible for all nations actually to assemble, right reason must derive the "voluntary" law from the purpose of the association itself, taken for what the will of all nations would be bound to agree. 28 Vattel rejected Wolff's fiction of submission to a global common will, grounding the "voluntary" law in a natural "society of nations" premised to the contrary on reciprocal respect for the independent judgment of sovereign states. 29 All these authors hoped to save the ius gentium from the collapse of the Roman law by grounding it in a rationally reconstructed law of nature, but their running disagreement over the relation of this "law of nature and nations" to positive law reflected the gap opened up between law and politics without the mediating institutions of universal Church and Empire.
A second line of thought, more directly pitched to diplomatic practice, took the simpler tack of collapsing ius gentium entirely into the positive law of compact and custom. This turned attention to compiling treaties and chronicling historical events as evidence of sovereigns assenting to general rules of conduct. Leibniz, interestingly, was the pioneer in this, and by the late eighteenth century, a consensus came to predominate in this school that the law of nations once supposed universal held in fact only among the nations of Europe, which were united by certain shared customs (notably having rejected slavery as the outcome of wars amongst Christians). 30 Distinctions between the rationalist and positivist camps were often muddy, however, because many eighteenth-century accounts freely combined natural law and positive sources without worrying overmuch about their philosophical relations. 31 We have also already encountered the third major line of thought in the period, that running from Hobbes to Rousseau. Instead of presuming the authority of universal law and arguing over its sources and methods of interpretation, this tack began with the political question of legitimate legislative authority. In the international case, Rousseau reworked St-Pierre's plan for perpetual peace, in Hobbes' language, as a solution to the problem of how to escape the state of nature among states. How had it taken so long, Rousseau asked, to see "that each of us being in a civil state with our fellow citizens and in a state of nature with all the rest of the world, we have only prevented wars among individuals to kindle from them general wars, which are a thousand times more terrible" and which might be prevented only by a "form of confederative government that, uniting Peoples by ties similar to those that unite individuals, submit equally one and the other to the authority of the Laws"? 32 Otherwise, as he wrote in an unpublished manuscript, "as for what one calls the law of nations, it is certain that, without a sanction, its laws are only chimeras still more feeble than the law of nature." 33 The long history of the ius gentium illustrates three key points, then, for understanding Kant. First, the point of his ius cosmopoliticum was not to extend new rights to individuals or non-state peoples, but to reinterpret familiar rights on a new basis. Second, in this he joined a debate that had opened in the early modern period over how to reconstruct the authority of law, both inside and outside states, once claims to universal jurisdiction of Church and Empire had broken down. And third, in this debate the exact definition of the law of nations, and its relation to both natural and civil law, became increasingly tied to competing claims about the sources of law and sorts of argumentative strategies to justify it. The key is to see that, because Kant's intervention needed to succeed simultaneously on all these levels, any viable interpretation of his right of hospitality must fit into a textually plausible account of his larger strategy for systematically re-establishing the claim of both domestic and international law to bind, in the absence of any lord or all the world.
Kant's Right of Hospitality
Kant's right of hospitality, then, was not new, but a reformulation of a central ius gentium right in debates over colonial wars running from Vitoria to Vattel. Vitoria and Grotius, inter alia, had argued that when non-state peoples reject trade with Europeans, they violate a sacred right of hospitality, committing an injury (iniuria) or harm (laesio) that entitles Europeans to vindicate their right by force. This had licensed plunder and conquest, since according to the tradition, one has the right to seize enemies' lands and to reduce enemies to the status of subjects or even slaves, insofar as needed to compensate an injury or secure against future threats. 34 Others, including Vattel, redefined hospitality explicitly to rule out this sort of aggression. 35 Kant's version followed Vattel in this, but for Kant it also served as the final piece of a response to
Hobbes' demand to seek peace as the condition of justice-as a way of defining an alternative to the state of nature, even where there were no states. Stopping wars with non-state peoples was important for its own sake, but also because they threatened the possibility of durable peace among European powers, and so also the rights of every citizen of states, which are ultimately only as secure as the international order (8:360, 6:311, 6:353). Kant's argument was less elliptical in his drafts for Perpetual Peace than in the published texts. There he set the problem in the Latin terms elsewhere attributed uniquely to Hobbes: "exeundum esse e statu naturali" (23:157), and he explained how cosmopolitan right completes a solution by removing justifications for war both abroad and back in Europe:
The principles of the supposed justice of acquiring newly discovered lands, taken for barbaric or unbelieving, as ownerless goods without the authorization of the inhabitants and even by subjugating them, are every one absolutely contrary to cosmopolitan rights limited to mere hospitality; and because Europe is the part of the world that sets itself wholly into mutual commerce… the spark of an injury to human right having fallen even in another part of the world, because of the flammability of the material of imperiousness in human nature, and above all in its leaders, the flame of war easily spreads to the region from which it received its source. (23:174-5) The key is to see that Kant defined hospitality not as a right to demand anything-which might be used to justify retaliation if the demand were refused-but instead as a right that certain States may fail to join up, or subsequently to respect arbitration or fulfill their duties of mutual defense. But Kant insists (at least by his final and most systematic political works of the 1790s) that the federation must be voluntary, force being reserved for defense against external powers who remain in a state of nature with respect to it. The point of ideas like this for Kant is practical or regulative: they are meant to provide a standard for judging present action because any act that contradicts them in principle can never be defended as just. 37 No such idea secures its own empirical enforcement or resolves disputes over its own interpretation. (Indeed, this is true even of the idea of a republican constitution, which is meant to guide action but must not be imposed by violent revolution.) What it does is provide a principle which, if honored, describes a condition of peace in which controversy over right no longer gives rise to war. Vitoria, by contrast, original common ownership had been a historical fact before a universally authoritative will divided property after the flood; for Vattel the earth was given by God to all for their subsistence, but was later justifiably divided because growing population meant that only more efficient private cultivation could continue to satisfy that purpose-and for both this division left in place a residual right of commerce or hospitality. 38 The debate Kant was engaging was over whether or not that right justified war. We have seen that Vitoria and Vattel disagreed, and the key to understanding the role of original common ownership for Kant is to see how and why he used it to support an answer different from either of theirs.
Others will object citing Kant's suggestion in Perpetual Peace that cosmopolitan right follows from the "spirit of commerce". But this is not part of its justification, only a (characteristically Kantian) subsidiary argument meant to show that justice does not demand the impossible by contravening nature, and is not therefore chimerical (8:368, cf. 6:354-5). That is why this appears in the section on "the guarantee of perpetual peace" and needn't reappear in the
Doctrine of Right.
Compare my account, finally, to others in the recent literature. Ripstein has sought to ground hospitality in Kant's suggestion that all individuals have a right "to be wherever nature or chance (apart from their will) has placed them" (6:262), but as Niesen points out, this cannot explain most of Kant's cases, which involve traders precisely "when neither nature nor chance but just [their] own will" has brought them into contact with another people (6:266). 39 Ripstein also argues that outsiders must treat ostensibly non-state peoples "as if" already in a rightful condition (a state), even though they may not be. 40 But as Stilz notes, this fits neither Kant's text nor the logic of his argument, which already precludes forcible assimilation wherever interaction is merely facultative and, one might add, includes contract and property rights already in the state of nature. 41 Kleingeld accepts Ripstein's first ground and adds a second in the innate individual right to the freedom to communicate one's thoughts. 42 But even together these cannot explain what distinguishes cosmopolitan right as public from the private rights of individuals already in the state of nature. And Kleingeld concedes that Ripstein's first ground appears to conflict with Kant's account of property rights. Stilz helpfully explains how provisional rights of first possession in the state of nature constrain interactions with non-state peoples, but she does not distinguish this from cosmopolitan right and hospitality, which for Kant are part not of private right but of the second-order public right overlaid on it to escape the controversy to which private right gives rise. 43 Niesen, drawing on Flikschuh, has argued that cosmopolitan right derives from obligations we take on in unilaterally appropriating part of the earth, since such acts exclude others and thus are held to require transition to a cosmopolitan condition in which they might be retroactively sanctioned (or historical injustices made good) by a global omnilateral will. 44 But that is Kant's argument for the state, not for cosmopolitan right, which for Kant requires not a global state (as that argument would suggest), but hospitality in relations with peoples remaining outside any state at all. Indeed, Kant insists on the disanalogy by claiming that one may not force non-state peoples into states if interaction with them is facultative rather than necessary. Muthu, like Niesen, rightly emphasizes Kant's rejection of colonialism in cosmopolitan right, but he grounds this in human sociability, whereas I have argued this was
Vattel's position that Kant rejected, for reasons he took from Hobbes. 45 Despite their differences, these interpretations all presume that cosmopolitan right needs a positive and independent ground. None considers the alternative for which I have argued-that it might be justified instead because it provides the third and final piece of a solution to the problem of right in controversy.
And yet this must be the correct reading, because positive grounds are just what generate controversy in the state of nature, whereas public right is supposed to leave behind that "state devoid of justice" by resolving the controversy and bringing peace.
Conclusion
If I am correct, then Kant's argument for a single cosmopolitan right of hospitality follows from a critique of a familiar sort of direct appeal to human rights or laws of reason that ignores the core political problem of authority in legislation, interpretation and enforcement. But that does not mean that beyond state borders reigns only war and never justice. To the contrary, Kant offers a sophisticated defense of a very narrow interpretation of cosmopolitan right, one that is not vulnerable to the skeptical attacks that bedevil more familiar views just because it insists, like Hobbes, on solving the skeptical problem on that problem's own terms. Kant's right of hospitality introduces a novel sort of right designed just so as never to be enforceable, to fill space that might otherwise be occupied by positive rights inviting controversy and strife, in contexts where the option of enforcement is off the table. His position thus asks us to consider whether sometimes pursuing global justice may require not more rights and duties beyond borders but fewer. And he makes a powerful and provocative case that peace can only serve justice if justice is first willing to serve peace.
